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We investigate  experimentally  the  effect  of  consultation  (unincentivized  advice)  on  choices
under risk  in an  incentivized  investment  task.  We  compare  consultation  to two  benchmark
treatments:  one  with  isolated  individual  choices,  and  a second  with  group  choice  after
communication.  Our  benchmark  treatments  replicate  ﬁndings  that  groups  take  more  risk
than  individuals  in  the  investment  task;  content  analysis  of group  discussions  reveals  that
higher risk-taking  in  groups  is  positively  correlated  with  mentions  of expected  value.  In
our  consultation  treatments,  we  ﬁnd  evidence  of  peer  effects:  decisions  within  the  peer
group are  signiﬁcantly  correlated.  However,  average  risk-taking  after  consultation  is  not
signiﬁcantly  different  from  isolated  individual  choices.  We also  ﬁnd  that  risk-taking  after
consultation  is not  affected  by adding  a  feedback  stage  in  which  subjects  see the  choices  of
their  consultation  peers.
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
. Introduction
The standard economic approach to the analysis of choice under risk emphasizes the role of individual risk preferences.
n deciding how much to invest in a risky asset, individuals weigh up the costs and beneﬁts referring to these preferences.
y contrast, in many important real-world settings individuals do not take choices in isolation, and the social settings
ithin which choices are made may  inﬂuence behavior. For example, individual choices may  be swayed by the opinions and
ecisions of others. In this paper we investigate how a common social setting, consultation with a group of peers, affects
Open access under CC BY license.hoices under risk in the laboratory.
There is abundant ﬁeld evidence that people’s choices are often inﬂuenced by their peers.1 While ﬁeld studies can
rovide compelling evidence of correlated behavior within peer groups, identifying these as peer effects is complicated by
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 0115 846 6130; fax: +44 0115 951 4159.
E-mail addresses: spiros.bougheas@nottingham.ac.uk (S. Bougheas), jeroen.nieboer@nottingham.ac.uk (J. Nieboer), martin.sefton@nottingham.ac.uk
M.  Sefton).
1 Peer effects have been found in a number of settings with choices under risk or uncertainty, such as investment decisions (Kelly and O’Grada, 2000;
ong  et al., 2004; Brown et al., 2008; Bursztyn et al., 2012), entrepreneurship decisions (Nanda and Sørensen, 2010; Lerner and Malmendier, 2011; Falck
t  al., 2012), credit-funded consumption decisions (Sotiropoulos and D’astous, 2012), criminal activity (Fergusson et al., 2002; Bayer et al., 2009), and drug
nd  alcohol use (Fergusson et al., 2002; Duncan et al., 2005; Powell et al., 2005; Lundborg, 2006; Clark and Lohéac, 2007). For a broad review of social
nﬂuence mechanisms, see Cialdini and Goldstein (2004).
167-2681     ©  2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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confounding factors (Manski, 1993). Moreover, it is difﬁcult to assess the inﬂuence of peer effects from ﬁeld data, as naturally
occurring control treatments where peer effects are absent but other variables are held constant are typically not available.
For these reasons we use a controlled laboratory experiment, described in Section 3, to investigate the effect of social
settings on investment decisions over multiple periods. Our experiment has two benchmark treatments that replicate Sutter’s
(2009) experiment on decision-making in groups. In one treatment, decisions are made by isolated individuals without any
communication with peers. In the other treatment, decisions are made by groups whose members can communicate and
have to agree on a single group decision via electronic chat. In our two  consultation treatments, subjects are also allowed to
freely communicate with their peer group, as in the benchmark treatment with groups, before making a decision. However,
each subject’s earnings depend only on his or her own choices and not on the choices of others. We  use this framework
because direct communication between peers is an important feature of many settings where peers may inﬂuence one
another.
Our focus on consultation contrasts with related laboratory studies of peer effects, discussed in Section 2, in which
subjects are informed of each other’s choices and may  be inﬂuenced by these, but there is no direct communication between
subjects (for example, Yechiam et al., 2008; Cooper and Rege, 2011; Lahno and Serra-Garcia, 2012). We  do, however, control
for the additional inﬂuence of seeing others’ choices by varying the degree of feedback we  offer to subjects across the two
consultation treatments. In one treatment we ensure that subjects are fully informed of the choices of others in their group
while in the other treatment they do not receive such feedback.
Our experiment is also related to experiments where subjects give and take advice (also discussed in the next section).
However, our framework departs from these studies in that we do not incentivize giving advice. Instead, the only motivations
for our subjects to give or take advice are intrinsic motivations independent of ﬁnancial consequences (as in many examples
of peer advice in everyday life). Also, our subjects face the same task at the same time as their peers, whereas in other
experiments on advice the experimental design induces differences between the experience and/or expertise of advice
givers and takers.
In Section 4 we report our results. The benchmark treatments replicate previous ﬁndings of higher risk-taking by groups
relative to isolated individuals (Sutter, 2007, 2009). Content analysis of the messages sent by group members shows that
higher levels of risk taking are associated with messages referring to expected value maximization. We  also ﬁnd some
evidence that risk-taking is higher in consultation groups where expected values are mentioned, although this effect is only
marginally signiﬁcant. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that consultation does not increase average risk-taking beyond that observed
among isolated individuals. Thus, simply providing direct communication between peers does not result in the higher risk-
taking observed when decisions are made by groups. We  do, however, ﬁnd evidence of peer effects in our consultation
treatments. Within consultation groups, variability in choices is signiﬁcantly lower than the variability in choices between
individuals from different groups; this result holds whether we  explicitly inform subjects of their peers’ previous round
choices or not. More generally, we do not ﬁnd any evidence that informing subjects of the previous round choices and
earnings in their peer group inﬂuences risk-taking when subjects already have the ability to consult with these peers
through electronic chat.
2. Related literature
Compared to the long history of empirical and ﬁeld studies of peer effects, the use of laboratory experiments to identify
peer effects is a recent development. Experiments have shown the existence of peer effects in labor productivity experiments
(Falk and Ichino, 2006; Eriksson et al., 2009; Bellemare et al., 2010), dictator games (Cason and Mui, 1998; Bicchieri and Xiao,
2009; Krupka and Weber, 2013), gift-exchange games (Thöni and Gächter, 2012; Gächter et al., 2012, 2013) and investment
games (Mittone and Ploner, 2011).
Peer effects have also been shown to affect individual choice under risk. Yechiam et al. (2008) let subjects make binary
choices under risk on a computer while looking at a real-time broadcast from another subject’s choice screen, thus exposing
subjects to each other’s choices and outcomes. The authors report that mutual observation in pairs leads to higher risk-
taking, but this effect is not observed when only one of the subjects in the pair observes the other. Cooper and Rege (2011)
test for peer effects in a series of binary choices under risk and ambiguity, using feedback about other subjects’ choices as
the channel for peer inﬂuence. They ﬁnd that subjects are signiﬁcantly more likely to change their response if it deviates
from the majority choice of peers. Cooper and Rege also report that the peer inﬂuences of the majority opinion spills over
into other gambles: if subjects observe the majority of their peers choosing the risky option in one choice, this makes them
more likely to choose the risky option in other choices. Finally, the authors show that the peer effects are consistent with a
model of ‘social regret’, the idea that obtaining a poor outcome from a gamble does not hurt as much if others have chosen
the same gamble. Most recently, Lahno and Serra-Garcia (2012) also test for peer effects in binary lottery choices and ﬁnd
substantial evidence of peer effects, though responses to the decisions of peers depend strongly on whether peer decisions
were voluntary or randomly imposed by the experimenter. Our work differs from these three studies in two important ways.
First, the vehicle for peer effects in these three studies is the observation of others’ decisions, whereas in our experiment it is
direct communication among peers. Second, whereas these three studies analyze binary lottery choices, we use a different
task that is well-suited to analyzing the level of risk-taking and has been used in previous experimental studies of group
decisions.
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Direct communication between subjects has been investigated in a number of experimental studies. Schotter (2003)
eviews experiments in which subjects receive recommendations from peers that have faced the same task. He presents
vidence that advice changes behavior in ultimatum games (Schotter and Sopher, 2007), coordination games (Schotter and
opher, 2003) and sequential guessing games (C¸ elen et al., 2010). The latter study also contains the striking result that subjects
re more likely to follow another’s recommendation rather than copy their action, although both variables have the same
nformational value. Chaudhuri et al. (2006) present evidence that advice leads to higher contributions and less free-riding in
 public goods game. Kocher et al. (2009) ﬁnd that receiving advice from peers in a beauty contest game is more effective than
bservational learning for improving performance. Schotter claims that advice increases efﬁciency or rationality because
the process of giving or receiving advice forces decision-makers to think about the problem they are facing different from
he way they would do if no advice were offered” (Schotter, 2003, p. 196). The possibility of our consultation treatments
aving such an effect is particularly intriguing. Previous experimental results with our experimental set-up have indicated
hat groups take more risk than individuals, and that group communication about the higher expected earnings associated
ith risk-taking is an important factor behind the increased risk-taking (Sutter, 2007, 2009). Speciﬁcally, Sutter (2009)
llows passive group members in one experimental treatment to send a single message to a single group decision-maker,
nd ﬁnds that the message type that is both most prevalent and effective urges the decision-maker to take more risk because
t will result in higher expected earnings.
The advice in the studies cited above is intergenerational and incentivized. Subjects playing in period t give advice to
ubjects playing in period t + 1, and advisors receive an additional payoff that depends on the performance of their advisee.
n our experiment, we do not incentivize giving advice. There is some experimental evidence that unincentivized peer
dvice affects the decisions of the advisee. Charness et al. (2010) report that that subjects perform signiﬁcantly better in a
robability-reasoning task after they discuss the task with fellow subjects. In an experiment with choice under ambiguity,
eck et al. (2012) present evidence that individual choices become more ambiguity-neutral after subjects discuss the exper-
mental task in a group. Charness et al. (2013) also ﬁnd that unincentivized advice from peers increases the percentage of
mbiguity-neutral choices by individuals; the authors claim this is due to ambiguity-neutral subjects possessing a “persua-
ive edge” over others (Charness et al., 2013, p. 11). The authors also report that the peer effect on choices is stronger when
ubjects in a consulting pair are incentivized for each other’s choices.
. The experiment
Our experimental design has four treatments: one treatment where isolated individuals make choices under risk
IND), one treatment with group choices (GRP) and two  treatments with individual choice after consultation (CONS and
ONS + FDBK). More speciﬁcally, for our IND and GRP treatments, which we use as benchmark treatments, we replicate the
esign used by Sutter (2009). Like Sutter, we use the investment task introduced by Gneezy and Potters (1997). To allow
or a faithful replication, we used Sutter’s instructions, software, experimental parameters and incentive structure for these
reatments.2 We  also used Sutter’s design as a basis for the new consultation treatments. Of course we use a different subject
ool: Sutter’s experiment used student subjects from the University of Jena (Germany) whereas we recruited our student
ubjects from the University of Nottingham (UK).
In the investment task, the decision-maker receives an endowment of 100 pence and chooses how much to invest in a
isky asset. With probability 2/3 the asset bears a zero return, and the decision-maker earns that part of her endowment
hat was not invested. With probability 1/3 the asset returns 3.5 times the investment, and so the decision-maker earns her
ndowment plus 2.5 times her investment. That is, if the decision-maker invests x her earnings in a round are given by
Earning =
{
100 − x with probability 2/3
100 + 2.5x with probability 1/3
This task is repeated over nine rounds, with the asset returns determined by independent draws at the end of each round
using a computerized random number generator).
An expected earnings-maximizing (risk-neutral) decision-maker would invest the full endowment (x = 100), yielding
xpected earnings of £1.17 in every round. More generally, expected earnings are strictly increasing in x. We use the amount
nvested in the risky asset as a measure of risk-taking.
In treatment IND subjects are not allowed to communicate with each other and they do not receive feedback about others’
hoices during or after the experiment. At the end of each round, subjects see a summary screen reminding them of their
hoice and informing them of their earnings for the round.
2 Instructions were taken from the English translations provided in Sutter (2009). The software was a set of a z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) treatment ﬁles,
ownloaded from the journal website at http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec09/20080341 data.zip and translated to English. There is one technical difference
etween Sutter’s original implementation and ours: whereas Sutter’s ‘mixed’ group treatment uses separate chat software for group communication,
e  use the built-in electronic chat function of z-Tree (version 3.3.8). [0]Regarding incentives, we  replace the D -sign with a £-sign for our two payment
ariables: the show-up fee (D 2 → £2) and round endowment (D 1 → £1). This means that incentives in our experiment are higher in real terms. Using the
conomist’s ‘Big Mac index’ (http://www.bigmacindex.org) as a proxy for PPP, we  estimate that the purchasing power of £1 in 2012 is 25% higher than D 1
n  2008.
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In treatment GRP, at the start of the experiment, groups of three subjects are randomly formed. Group composition is
ﬁxed for the whole experiment. In each round, group members can use an on-screen electronic chat to arrive at a consensus
decision for the amount x. At any point during the chat, group members can submit a consensus decision by each entering
the same amount x on their decision screens. If the values of x submitted by the three members are not the same, there is
no consensus choice for the round and all group members receive nothing.3
As in treatment GRP, subjects in treatments CONS are randomly assigned to groups of three subjects that stay together for
the whole experiment. The decision screen for this treatment also features an electronic chat between the group members,
but the chat is used for consultation instead of reaching a consensus. This means that subjects in the same consultation group
are not required to agree with others’ choices. We  thus have an individual decision-making structure, plus consultation. At
the end of the round, each subject sees a round summary screen reminding them of their own  choice and informing them
of their own earnings (as in IND).
In treatment CONS + FDBK, subjects are also assigned to groups of three in which they can consult others before taking
a decision. At the end of each round, subjects also see a feedback screen with their own choice and earnings in the round.
However, subjects in this treatment see an additional screen with feedback for the round, which informs them of the choices
and earnings of the other two members in the peer group. Thus, subjects are not solely dependent on discussion during the
consultation stage to learn about their peers’ choices.
3.1. Procedures
The experiment was carried out in the CeDEx laboratory at the University of Nottingham, in a total of 28 sessions between
November 2011 and October 2012. We  used ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) to recruit our subjects. Subjects were (mostly undergrad-
uate) students from various disciplines, who had previously registered for participation in economic experiments. Altogether,
462 subjects took part in the experiment: 69 participated in treatment IND, 144 (48 groups of 3) participated in treatment
GRP, 126 (42 groups of 3) participated in treatment CONS and 123 (41 groups of 3) participated in treatment CONS + FDBK.
In all treatments, subjects sit at computer terminals separated by dividers and are not allowed to communicate with
one another (except through the experimental software in the relevant treatments). Subjects are given instructions (repro-
duced in the Appendix) that are read aloud. Subjects then make decisions over nine rounds, with the results of the lottery,
their resulting round earnings, and accumulated earnings given in a feedback screen at the end of each round. Subjects in
CONS + FDBK also received an additional feedback screen displaying the choices and earnings of other group members at the
end of each round.
To resolve the lottery we assigned each individual/group a type at the beginning of the session, with equal numbers of
subjects given each of the three possible types: 1, 2, and 3. At the end of each round subjects of one given type were successful
in the lottery, depending on the realization of a computerized random number draw. In the consultation treatments all
members of a consultation group had the same type, and thus either all members of a consultation group received a zero
return on their individual investments, or all members received the positive return.
After the ﬁnal round, subjects complete a questionnaire and are paid. Each subject is paid their full earnings for all nine
rounds, plus a show-up fee of £2. Average subject earnings (including a show-up fee) were £11.71, with an average session
time of 35 min.
4. Results
4.1. Average investment levels
Table 1 lists average investment in all treatments, averaged over all nine rounds and in blocks of three rounds. For
comparability, we also include the averages of the original benchmark treatments (IND and GRP) as reported by Sutter
(2009).
Average investment by individuals in our experiment closely mirrors the data from Sutter, whereas the average invest-
ment levels of our groups are slightly lower. Pair-wise comparisons between our IND and GRP treatments reject the null
hypothesis of equal distributions, whether we focus on the average across all rounds or the average in three-round blocks.
We thus replicate the results of Sutter (2009): risk-taking is signiﬁcantly higher in groups than among isolated individuals.
Subjects in treatment IND choose in isolation, whereas subjects in the consultation treatments (CONS and CONS + FDBK)
can communicate with peers in their consultation groups. We  ﬁnd that the opportunity to communicate with peers has a very
weak effect on average individual risk-taking, with a (marginally) signiﬁcant effect only in the last three rounds. This result
holds for comparisons of IND with both treatments CONS and CONS + FDBK. In fact, when we  focus on average risk-taking
3 The same tie-breaking rule was used in Sutter (2009), and it is very effective in motivating group members to reach consensus. Only 6 out of 378
decisions in our treatment GRP failed to produce a consensus decision, and never more than once per group. In each of these 6 cases, two group members
agreed on the group choice but the third member submitted a different value. We use the majority choice as the data point in these cases, noting that our
results  are not affected by excluding these observations.
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Table 1
Percentage of endowment invested.
Sutter (2009) Our experiment
IND GRP IND GRP CONS CONS + FDBK
(n  = 64) (n = 28) (n = 69) (n = 48) (n = 42) (n = 41)
Rounds 1–3 39.6 53.4 39.3 48.7** 38.9 40.2
Rounds 4–6 38.5 56.1 42.4 51.8* 40.5 39.0
Rounds 7–9 40.1 57.6 37.3 53.5** 44.8* 45.4*
All rounds 39.4 55.7 39.7 51.3** 41.4 41.6
The ﬁrst two data columns contain the averages from the original benchmark treatments in Sutter (2009); the last four columns are the investment
averages from our experiment. For IND the unit of observation is the individual. For GRP we  take the consensus decision of all group members as the unit of
observation. For the consultation treatments we  take the average choice of the three group members as the unit of observation. The number of independent
observations is indicated below the treatment names.
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** Denote signiﬁcant differences from our IND treatment at the 5% level, based on two-sided Mann–Whitney U tests.
cross the experiment, we ﬁnd no evidence that risk-taking after consultation is different from choosing individually in
solation.
Investment levels in CONS and CONS + FDBK are remarkably similar: the average investment across nine rounds is nearly
dentical, and even the increase in the ﬁnal rounds is similar. In fact, none of the three-round pair-wise comparisons between
ONS and CONS + FDBK allow us to reject the null that investment is the same in both treatments (two-sided Mann–Whitney
 tests, all p > 0.10). Recall that treatment CONS + FDBK differs from CONS in that it has an additional feedback screen that
hows the previous round choices and earnings of the two  other members of the consultation group. We thus ﬁnd no evidence
hat showing subjects the choices of peers affects their risk-taking when subjects already have the ability to consult with
eers.
.2. Peer effects and within-group variability
By design, subjects in the IND treatment cannot inﬂuence one another’s choices. Their decisions reﬂect their individual
isk preferences and perceptions of the decision task. What about the consultation treatments? Here subjects are free to
ake the same choices they would make if they were isolated individuals, but they may  be susceptible to peer effects: they
ould be inﬂuenced by the messages, or by the actual choices and earnings of other members of their consultation group.
ince consultation does not increase the level of individual risk-taking, we now look for evidence of another type of peer
ffect: similarity of choices between peers.
Fig. 1 shows the mean distance between a subject’s investment and other subjects’ investment in each round. The ‘other
ubjects’ are (i) subjects of different types in the same session, (ii) subjects of the same type in a session (therefore sharing
 common history of lottery wins and losses) or (iii) the two  fellow consultation group members. This metric allows us to
ompare the consultation treatments to the individual treatment. For presentational purposes, we combine observations
rom both consultation treatments; using separate lines for separate consultation treatments does not affect the overall
icture.
Fig. 1 shows that subjects’ investments diverge over time in both the consultation and individual treatments. However,
his divergence is smaller for subjects of the same type than for subjects of different types, and even smaller for subjects
n the same consultation group. The graphs in Fig. 1 suggest the existence of a particular type of peer effect: consultation
ith other subjects leads to decisions that are closer together than isolated individual decisions, even when taking common
hocks in lottery outcomes (subjects with the same type) into account.4
We  also analyze the similarity between decisions within consultation groups statistically. Because this type of peer effect
an manifest itself across rounds (e.g. a subject copying a fellow group member’s previous round investment, while said
ellow group member chooses a different investment level in the current round), we  look at each subject’s average investment
cross the nine rounds. Running a simple OLS regression of investment on consultation group dummy  variables, we ﬁnd that
roup dummies are jointly signiﬁcant in both consultation treatments (CONS: F(41, 84) = 2.63, p = 0.000; CONS + FDBK: F(40,
2) = 1.94, p = 0.006). The explanatory power of group dummies reﬂects the fact that average investment is more similar to
embers of the same consultation group than to those in different consultation groups.
For a non-parametric approach we compute the within-group standard deviation (WGSD) of the individual averages
or each consultation group.5 We  then take the average WGSD in our consultation treatments (19.4 in CONS; 20.8 in
4 Recall, in order to enhance comparability between our consultation and group treatments all consultation group members were of the same type and
o  the return on investment was either zero for all members of a consultation group or positive for all members.
5 That is for each individual we took their average investment across all nine rounds before computing the standard deviation of the averages for that
roup.  This measure gives a WGSD between zero and an upper bound of approximately 57.7.
278 S. Bougheas et al. / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 92 (2013) 273– 283Fig. 1. Mean distance (absolute difference) between a subject’s investment and other subjects’ investment levels.
CONS + FDBK) and compared it to the distribution of test statistics generated using Fisher’s randomization procedure.6
For both treatments we reject the null hypothesis that the WGSD in the consultation groups is from the same distribution as
that of randomly formed three-person groups without interaction (CONS: p = 0.001; CONS + FDBK: p = 0.000). We  thus ﬁnd
that consultation leads to signiﬁcantly lower variability of investments between the three members of a consultation group,
providing strong evidence that individuals do not choose independently of one another after consultation.
Finally, as a more stringent control for the possibility that intra-group correlation develops as a result of common shocks
in the lottery outcomes, we repeat our analysis using choices from the ﬁrst round only. Since the only difference between
the consultation treatments is the feedback at the end of a round, we pool the ﬁrst-round data from the two consultation
treatments. Group dummies are again signiﬁcant in a regression of individual investments (F(82, 166) = 1.31, p = 0.075), and
the randomization test again detects signiﬁcant within-group correlation (average WGSD = 22.7, p = 0.029). If we exclude
the 47 consultation groups that do not chat in round one the effect is even stronger (F(35, 72) = 1.70, p = 0.030; average
WGSD = 20.8, p = 0.001).
4.3. Communication content analysis
Communication within groups has very different effects on investment in the group versus the consultation treatments.
Whereas in the group treatment the level of investment goes up relative to the individual treatment, the level of investment
in consultation treatments is similar to individuals, albeit with signiﬁcant peer effects in groups. To gain an understanding
of why this is so, we examine the messages sent via the electronic chat communication. Two  trained research assistants
assigned chat messages to one or more of the following categories:
• Amount. A suggestion of investment amount x (or range of values) for the current round.
• Cautious. A statement that signals the individual’s preference to take less risk by decreasing x.
• Emotive. A message indicating an emotional response to events in the experiment.
• EV. Calculations of expected value for values of x.
• Off-topic. A message that does not relate to the experimental task.
• Risky. A statement that signals the individual’s preference to take more risk by increasing x.
• Team building. A message referring to the group itself, individual group members, or group members’ common fate.Our research assistants received the same instructions but worked independently. Their assignments of statements to
categories were cross-checked for validity by calculating Cohen’s Kappa coefﬁcient (Cohen, 1960) for each category. A high
6 We drew 100,000 samples of individual averages from the empirical distribution, randomly assigning individuals to groups and counting the proportion
of  statistics exceeding the observed statistic. More details on the properties of this statistical procedure, as well as comparisons to commonly used parametric
and  non-parametric techniques can be found in Moir (1998).
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Table 2
Kappa values and average frequency (per group) for chat message categories.
Category Description Cohen’s Kappa Category frequency
GRP CONS CONS + FDBK GRP CONS CONS + FDBK
Amount Proposal of a speciﬁc amount 0.857 0.926 0.905 17.1 (10.6%) 3.1 (6.3%) 2.8 (7.6%)
Cautious Appeal to take less risk 0.695 0.903 0.651 2.8 (1.7%) 0.8 (1.6%) 0.3 (0.8%)
Emotive Emotive response 0.859 0.938 0.859 14.0 (8.7%) 3.8 (7.7%) 2.8 (7.6%)
EV  Expected value 0.703 0.759 0.820 2.0 (1.2%) 0.3 (0.6%) 0.3 (0.8%)
Off-topic Off-topic 0.898 0.904 0.847 6.9 (4.3%) 5.3 (11.1%) 2.9 (8.0%)
Risky Appeal to take more risk 0.584 0.885 0.721 3.2 (2.0%) 0.8 (1.6%) 0.4 (1.1%)
Teambuilding Reference to group identity 0.658 0.877 0.825 5.0 (3.1%) 3.6 (7.3%) 1.8 (4.9%)
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Average number of classiﬁed messages 42.6 17.7 11.4
appa coefﬁcient indicates a high proportion of agreement between the two assistants’ category judgments. Following
andis and Koch (1977), we employ a threshold Kappa value of 0.41, indicating at least moderate agreement between our
esearch assistants. Table 2 shows the treatment-speciﬁc Kappa values for each category, as well as the average number of
imes a message in the category was sent in a group. We  see that all of our content categories exceed the threshold Kappa
alue of 0.41. We  also report the average number of messages in each category per group.7
Note that subjects send considerably fewer messages in the consultation treatments than in the GRP treatment.8
ne plausible explanation for this difference is that groups have a clear incentive to ﬁnd a consensus decision in the
RP treatment (zero earnings if consensus is not reached), whereas communication in the consultation treatments is
ot strictly necessary. On a related note, it could be that the higher average investment in the GRP treatment is due to
he amount of communication: more chat leads to higher investments. As a simple test of this hypothesis, we  calcu-
ate the correlation between the average investment and number of messages (all messages or only on-topic messages)
n each group. We  ﬁnd no evidence of a signiﬁcant correlation between these variables for any of the treatments GRP,
ONS and CONS + FDBK (Spearman rank correlations, all p > 0.10). To investigate to what extent subjects respond to the
eaning of chat messages, we estimate a Tobit regression where the dependent variable is the average investment in a
roup and with the average number of messages in each category as explanatory variables.9 The results are reported in
able 3.
The coefﬁcients for message categories Risky and Cautious have the signs one would expect: Risky is positively corre-
ated with investment (although not signiﬁcantly in GRP or CONS), and Cautious is negatively correlated with investment.
he coefﬁcient on Emotive messages is positive and signiﬁcant in the GRP treatment; one potential explanation is that
roups that risk a bigger part of their endowment are more engaged in the lottery, and therefore express more emo-
ive responses in the chat at the start of the next round. The coefﬁcients on EV are positive and, except for CONS,
igniﬁcant: more messages referring to the expected value of various decisions are associated with higher investment.
his result is in line with the hypothesis that higher investment by groups is associated with expected value max-
mization, as observed in the communication data presented by Sutter (2009). The fact that consultation does not
ead to higher average risk-taking may  be because discussion of expected value has a weaker effect than in the GRP
reatment (note that the coefﬁcient is smaller and insigniﬁcant in CONS, and although higher in CONS + FDBK the coef-
cient is signiﬁcant only at the 10% level), or it may  be simply because there is less discussion of expected value (see
able 2).
Finally, the regression results in the ﬁnal column of Table 3 show no signiﬁcant difference in responses to content between
he CONS and CONS + FDBK treatments. This result is in line with the results on investment discussed earlier. Given that
ubjects have the opportunity to consult with fellow group members, showing feedback on fellow group members’ choices
nd earnings has no additional effect on risk-taking by individuals. We also ﬁnd no evidence that subjects use the peer
eedback screen in CONS + FDBK as a substitute for discussion of investment amounts in the consultation stage: the average
umber of messages in the ‘Amount’ category is nearly identical in both consultation treatments, even though the total
umber of messages sent in treatment CONS + FDBK is lower. This result may  be explained by heterogeneity in susceptibility
o peer effects: those who are sensitive to others’ choices will discuss choices with peers anyway, whereas more single-
inded individuals will ignore others’ choices regardless of whether they learn about these through consultation or by
eing shown them by the experimenters.7 A chat message belongs to a category if it was coded as such by at least one of our research assistants.
8 Note also that fewer messages are sent in the CONS + FDBK treatment than the CONS treatment. A possible explanation for this may be that the additional
eedback on other members’ choices in CONS + FDBK substitutes for communication about previous choices.
9 The regression models were also estimated with dummies for group composition demographics (age, gender, and number of economics/business
tudents). These variables were always insigniﬁcant and do not affect our results.
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Table 3
Tobit regressions of avg. investment on number of messages in content categories.
GRP CONS CONS + FDBK CONS and
CONS + FDBK
Amount 0.922 1.560 0.112 1.455
(1.046) (0.934) (0.665) (0.906)
Cautious −4.801*** −5.660* −5.650** −5.794**
(1.768) (2.921) (2.687) (2.852)
Emotive 0.814* 1.020 0.624 0.973
(0.484) (0.803) (0.474) (0.783)
EV 4.164*** 2.004 6.183* 2.217
(1.468) (1.870) (3.438) (1813)
Risky 0.617  0.843 6.722* 0.855
(1.402) (2.455) (3.423) (2.399)
Off-topic 0.443  0.0112 −0.680 0.003
(0.265) (0.152) (0.436) (0.149)
Teambuilding −0.739  −0.330 −1.330 −0.441
(0.733) (0.713) (1.143) (0.686)
CONS  + FDBK × amount −1.288
(1.132)
CONS + FDBK × cautious 0.216
(3.982)
CONS + FDBK × emotive −0.333
(0.923)
CONS + FDBK × EV 4.195
(4.004)
CONS + FDBK × risky 6.174
(4.271)
CONS + FDBK × off-topic −0.700
(0.476)
CONS + FDBK × teambuilding −0.661
(1.325)
Number of observations 48 42 41 83
Prob.  > 2 0.00123 0.0491 0.0303 0.0117
Standard errors in parentheses. For treatment GRP we take the consensus decision of all group members as the unit of observation. For the consultation
treatments we take the average choice of the three group members as the unit of observation.* Denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, level.
** Denote signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Denote signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
5. Conclusion
Using a simple investment task we compare choices under risk by three types of decision-maker: isolated individuals,
groups, and individuals who can consult each other. In line with previous research using the same investment task (Sutter,
2007, 2009), we ﬁnd that groups take more risk than individuals. When individuals can consult one another we ﬁnd that
communication among peers leads to signiﬁcant correlation of decisions within the consultation group. However, consulta-
tion has a weak effect on the level of risk-taking: average risk-taking after consultation is not signiﬁcantly different from the
average risk-taking of isolated individuals. We  also ﬁnd that, if subjects can already consult with others in their peer group,
explicitly showing them the choices and earnings of peers does not change their behavior.
Although consulting individuals can discuss the task in the same way  as group decision-makers, content analysis reveals
some important differences between treatments. Perhaps most importantly, subjects in the consultation treatment exchange
fewer messages than in the group treatment, including messages discussing expected values. This may  explain why con-
sultation fails to increase average investment, since mentions of expected value have a strong effect on average investment
in the group treatment. These results suggest that having to make a group choice under risk is quite different from giving
people the opportunity to communicate with peers.
Our consultation treatments were designed to isolate the effect of unincentivized communication between peers. If
subjects had been ﬁnancially motivated to provide others with investment advice – for example, if they had been paid a
percentage of others’ earnings – it is possible that consultation would have had a signiﬁcant effect on the level of investment.
Similarly, we chose not to direct subjects to use communication in any particular way. If we had made it mandatory for
subjects to justify their choice to their peers, this might have induced them to think differently about the task (and perhaps
about the expected value of their choices), and may  have resulted in a higher level of investment. Thus, our ﬁnding that
consultation does not translate into higher levels of investment than are made by isolated individuals may  reﬂect particular
features of our design. Nevertheless, it is notable that even in our relatively simple consultation setting subjects’ decisions
are inﬂuenced by their peers, as evidenced by the similarity of investment decisions within consultation groups. Further
investigation of how features of the social setting inﬂuence risk-taking among peers seems a promising direction for future
research.
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ppendix A. Experimental instructions
.1. Treatment IND
This experiment consists of 9 rounds. In each round you will receive an endowment of 100 pence (1 pound). You must
ecide which part of this endowment (between 0 pence and 100 pence) you wish to invest in a lottery. The investment will
e denoted as amount X.
The outcome of the lottery is as follows:
With probability 2/3 (66.67%) you lose the amount X you have invested and your pay-off in the respective round is
Pay-off = 100 − X pence.
With probability 1/3 (33.33%) you win two and a half times the amount X you have invested in addition to your initial
endowment and your pay-off in the respective round is Pay-off = 100 + 2.5X pence.
The actual outcome of the lottery depends on a randomly drawn number out of the uniformly distributed interval [0, 3]
nd on your type. There are three possible types: types 1, 2, and 3. In the ﬁrst round, you will be informed about your type,
hich remains ﬁxed for all nine rounds.
Type 1 wins if the random number in a given round is from the interval [0, 1].
Type 2 wins if the random number in a given round is from the interval (1, 2].
Type 3 wins if the random number in a given round is from the interval (2, 3].
The random number in a given round is identical for all participants in the experiment and it will be independently drawn
new in each consecutive round. After all individuals have entered their decision, you will be informed about the outcome
f the random number draw, about whether you have won or lost in the respective round, about your round pay-off and
our accumulated pay-off in the whole experiment. For your ﬁnal earnings, we  will add up your pay-offs in all nine rounds.
In each round, you have 3 min  to submit your decision. Please do not communicate with other subjects at any point
uring the experiment. Anybody found in breach of this rule will be dismissed without payment.
.2. Treatment GRP
At the start of this experiment, you will be randomly matched with two  other individuals in the room to form a team of
hree. Team members will remain anonymous; no-one will ﬁnd out who their fellow team members are during or after the
xperiment.
This experiment consists of 9 rounds. In each round your team will receive an endowment of 100 pence (1 pound). Your
eam must decide which part of this endowment (between 0 pence and 100 pence) you wish to invest in a lottery. The
nvestment will be denoted as amount X. Within your team, you have to agree on a single choice of the amount X.
The outcome of the lottery is as follows:
With probability 2/3 (66.67%) you lose the amount X you have invested and your pay-off in the respective round is
Pay-off = 100 − X pence.
With probability 1/3 (33.33%) you win two and a half times the amount X you have invested in addition to your initial
endowment and your pay-off in the respective round is Pay-off = 100 + 2.5X pence.
The actual outcome of the lottery depends on a randomly drawn number out of the uniformly distributed interval [0, 3]
nd on your type. There are three possible types: types 1, 2, and 3. In the ﬁrst round, you will be informed about your type,
hich remains ﬁxed for all nine rounds.Type 1 wins if the random number in a given round is from the interval [0, 1].
Type 2 wins if the random number in a given round is from the interval (1, 2].
Type 3 wins if the random number in a given round is from the interval (2, 3].
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The random number in a given round is identical for all participants in the experiment and it will be independently drawn
anew in each consecutive round. After all teams have entered their decision, you will be informed about the outcome of
the random number draw, about whether you have won  or lost in the respective round, about your round payoff and your
accumulated payoffs up to and including that round. For your ﬁnal earnings, we will add up your payoffs in all nine rounds.
Please note that each single member of a team will be paid the full earnings, which, of course, are identical for all team
members.
Within your team, you and the other members have to agree on the amount X in each round. In order to reach agreement,
you can communicate with the two other subjects via an electronic chat which will appear on your computer screen. If you
have agreed on an amount X, please enter the amount on your input screen and conﬁrm your entry. If the three members of
your team do not enter the same amount X then all team members will earn zero in this round.
It is forbidden to send any message that might reveal your identity to the other team members. If you violate this rule
you will not receive any payment.
A.3. Treatments CONS and CONS + FDBK
At the start of this experiment, you will be randomly matched with two other individuals in the room to form a group of
three. Group members will remain anonymous no-one will ﬁnd out who their fellow group members are during or after the
experiment.
This experiment consists of nine rounds. In each round you will receive an endowment of 100 pence (1 pound). You must
decide which part of this endowment (between 0 pence and 100 pence) you wish to invest in a lottery. The investment will
be denoted as amount X.
The outcome of the lottery is as follows:
• With probability 2/3 (66.67%) you lose the amount X you have invested and your pay-off in the respective round is
Pay-off = 100 − X pence.
• With probability 1/3 (33.33%) you win two and a half times the amount X you have invested in addition to your initial
endowment and your pay-off in the respective round is Pay-off = 100 + 2.5X pence.
The actual outcome of the lottery depends on a randomly drawn number out of the uniformly distributed interval [0, 3]
and on your type. There are three possible types: types 1, 2, and 3. In the ﬁrst round, you will be informed about your type,
which remains ﬁxed for all nine rounds.
• Type 1 wins if the random number in a given round is from the interval [0, 1].
• Type 2 wins if the random number in a given round is from the interval (1, 2].
• Type 3 wins if the random number in a given round is from the interval (2, 3].
The random number in a given round is identical for all participants in the experiment and it will be independently drawn
anew in each consecutive round. After all individuals have entered their decision, you will be informed about the outcome
of the random number draw, about whether you have won  or lost in the respective round, about your round payoff and your
accumulated payoffs up to and including that round. [CONS + FDBK only: You will also see a summary screen that shows the
earnings of the other members of your group in the current round.] For your ﬁnal earnings, we will add up your payoffs in
all nine rounds.
Within your group, each individual member can choose a different amount X in each round. Your earnings do not depend
on the choices of the other group members. Before you enter your amount X, you can communicate with the two  other
subjects via an electronic chat which will appear on your computer screen. You are free to consult with them and discuss
any aspect of the experiment. However, it is forbidden to send any message that might reveal your identity to the other
group members. If you violate this rule you will not receive any payment.
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